ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection

This document specifies the test and evaluation methods for physically unclonable functions (PUFs). The test and evaluation methods consist of inspection of the design rationale of the PUF and comparison between statistical analyses of the responses from a batch of PUFs or a unique PUF versus specified thresholds. This document is related to ISO/IEC 19790 which specifies security requirements for cryptographic modules. In those modules, critical security parameters (key) and public security parameters (product serial number, identification code, etc.) are the assets to protect. PUF is one solution to avoid storing security parameters, thereby increasing the overall security of a cryptographic module.

This document: — introduces the break down between the former ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008) and ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008) and ISO/IEC 18045:2008 and the new parts introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022; — presents the concepts newly introduced as well as the rationale for their inclusion; — proposes an evolution path and information on how to move from CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 to the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022, respectively; — maps the evolutions between the CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 and the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022, respectively.

This document specifies tweakable block ciphers. A tweakable block cipher is a family of n-bit permutations parametrized by a secret key value and a public tweak value. Such primitives are generic tools that can be used as building blocks to construct cryptographic schemes such as encryption, Message Authentication Codes, authenticated encryption, etc. A total of five different tweakable block ciphers are defined. They are categorized in Table 1.

The ISO/IEC 15946 series specifies public-key cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves described in ISO/IEC 15946-1. This document defines elliptic curve generation techniques useful for implementing the elliptic curve based mechanisms defined in ISO/IEC 29192‑4, ISO/IEC 9796‑3, ISO/IEC 11770‑3, ISO/IEC 14888‑3, ISO/IEC 18033‑2 and ISO/IEC 18033‑5. This document is applicable to cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves defined over finite fields of prime power order (including the special cases of prime order and characteristic two). This document is not applicable to the representation of elements of the underlying finite field (i.e. which basis is used).

This document provides a reference set of generic information security controls including implementation guidance. This document is designed to be used by organizations: a) within the context of an information security management system (ISMS) based on ISO/IEC27001; b) for implementing information security controls based on internationally recognized best practices; c) for developing organization-specific information security management guidelines.

This document provides general descriptions and specifications of anonymous entity authentication mechanisms based on blind digital signatures.

This document covers the protection of biometric information under various requirements for confidentiality, integrity and renewability/revocability during storage and transfer. It also provides requirements and recommendations for the secure and privacy-compliant management and processing of biometric information. This document specifies the following: — analysis of the threats to and countermeasures inherent to biometrics and biometric system application models; — security requirements for securely binding between a biometric reference (BR) and an identity reference (IR); — biometric system application models with different scenarios for the storage and comparison of BRs; — guidance on the protection of an individual's privacy during the processing of biometric information. This document does not include general management issues related to physical security, environmental security and key management for cryptographic techniques.

This document specifies requirements for establishing virtualized roots of trust.

This document gives guidance on the integrated implementation of ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 20000-1 for organizations intending to: a) implement ISO/IEC27001 when ISO/IEC 20000-1 is already implemented, or vice versa; b) implement both ISO/IEC27001 and ISO/IEC 20000-1 together; or c) integrate existing management systems based on ISO/IEC27001 and ISO/IEC 20000-1. This document focuses exclusively on the integrated implementation of an information security management system (ISMS) as specified in ISO/IEC 27001 and a service management system (SMS) as specified in ISO/IEC 20000-1.

This document complements and supplements the procedures and general requirements found in ISO/IEC 17025:2017 for laboratories performing testing based on ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 24759.

This document complements and supplements the procedures and general requirements found in ISO/IEC 17025:2017 for laboratories performing evaluations based on the ISO/IEC 15408 series and ISO/IEC 18045.

This document defines key management mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques. It specifically addresses the use of asymmetric techniques to achieve the following goals. a) Establish a shared secret key for use in a symmetric cryptographic technique between two entities A and B by key agreement. In a secret key agreement mechanism, the secret key is computed as the result of a data exchange between the two entities A and B. Neither of them is able to predetermine the value of the shared secret key. b) Establish a shared secret key for use in a symmetric cryptographic technique between two entities A and B via key transport. In a secret key transport mechanism, the secret key is chosen by one entity A and is transferred to another entity B, suitably protected by asymmetric techniques. c) Make an entity's public key available to other entities via key transport. In a public key transport mechanism, the public key of entity A is transferred to other entities in an authenticated way, but not requiring secrecy. Some of the mechanisms of this document are based on the corresponding authentication mechanisms in ISO/IEC 9798‑3. This document does not cover certain aspects of key management, such as: — key lifecycle management; — mechanisms to generate or validate asymmetric key pairs; and — mechanisms to store, archive, delete, destroy, etc., keys. While this document does not explicitly cover the distribution of an entity's private key (of an asymmetric key pair) from a trusted third party to a requesting entity, the key transport mechanisms described can be used to achieve this. A private key can in all cases be distributed with these mechanisms where an existing, non-compromised key already exists. However, in practice the distribution of private keys is usually a manual process that relies on technological means such as smart cards, etc. This document does not specify the transformations used in the key management mechanisms. NOTE To provide origin authentication for key management messages, it is possible to make provisions for authenticity within the key establishment protocol or to use a public key signature system to sign the key exchange messages.

This document contains guidelines for developing and establishing policies and procedures for deletion of personally identifiable information (PII) in organizations by specifying: — a harmonized terminology for PII deletion; — an approach for defining deletion rules in an efficient way; — a description of required documentation; — a broad definition of roles, responsibilities and processes. This document is intended to be used by organizations where PII is stored or processed. This document does not address: — specific legal provision, as given by national law or specified in contracts; — specific deletion rules for particular clusters of PII that are defined by PII controllers for processing PII; — deletion mechanisms; — reliability, security and suitability of deletion mechanisms; — specific techniques for de-identification of data.

This document is general in nature and provides definitions that apply in subsequent parts of the ISO/IEC 18033 series. It introduces the nature of encryption and describes certain general aspects of its use and properties.

This document specifies mechanisms that generate, renew, and verify independent time-stamps. In order to verify an independent time-stamp token, time-stamp verifiers do not need access to any other time-stamp tokens. That is, such time-stamp tokens are not linked.

This document is an introductory part of ISO/IEC 27036. It provides an overview of the guidance intended to assist organizations in securing their information and information systems within the context of supplier relationships. It also introduces concepts that are described in detail in the other parts of ISO/IEC 27036. This document addresses perspectives of both acquirers and suppliers.

This document provides a framework and establishes requirements for attribute-based unlinkable entity authentication (ABUEA).

This document specifies mechanisms for cross-domain password-based authenticated key exchange, all of which are four-party password-based authenticated key exchange (4PAKE) protocols. Such protocols let two communicating entities establish a shared session key using just the login passwords that they share with their respective domain authentication servers. The authentication servers, assumed to be part of a standard public key infrastructure (PKI), act as ephemeral certification authorities (CAs) that certify key materials that the users can subsequently use to exchange and agree on as a session key. This document does not specify the means to be used to establish a shared password between an entity and its corresponding domain server. This document also does not define the implementation of a PKI and the means for two distinct domain servers to exchange or verify their respective public key certificates.

This document specifies MAC algorithms that use a secret key and a hash-function (or its round-function or sponge function) to calculate an m-bit MAC. These mechanisms can be used as data integrity mechanisms to verify that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner. NOTE A general framework for the provision of integrity services is specified in ISO/IEC 10181‑6.

This document provides guidance on the ways an organization can plan and prepare for, and implement, electronic discovery from the perspective of both technology and processes. This document provides guidance on proactive measures that can help enable effective and appropriate electronic discovery and processes. This document is relevant to both non-technical and technical personnel involved in some or all of the electronic discovery activities.

This document specifies properties of cryptographic mechanisms to redact authentic data. In particular, it defines the processes involved in those mechanisms, the participating parties, and the cryptographic properties.

This document defines a process reference model (PRM) for the domain of information security management, which is meeting the criteria defined in ISO/IEC 33004 for process reference models (see Annex A). It is intended to guide users of ISO/IEC 27001 to: — incorporate the process approach as described by ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 4.3, within the ISMS; — be aligned to all the work done within other standards of the ISO/IEC 27000 family from the perspective of the operation of ISMS processes — support users in the operation of an ISMS ? this document is complementing the requirements-oriented perspective of ISO/IEC 27003 with an operational, process-oriented point of view.

This document specifies requirements and provides guidance for bodies providing audit and certification of a privacy information management system (PIMS) according to ISO/IEC 27701 in combination with ISO/IEC 27001, in addition to the requirements contained within ISO/IEC 27006 and ISO/IEC 27701. It is primarily intended to support the accreditation of certification bodies providing PIMS certification. The requirements contained in this document need to be demonstrated in terms of competence and reliability by anybody providing PIMS certification, and the guidance contained in this document provides additional interpretation of these requirements for any body providing PIMS certification. NOTE This document can be used as a criteria document for accreditation, peer assessment or other audit processes.

This document specifies guidelines for developing a cybersecurity framework. It is applicable to cybersecurity framework creators regardless of their organizations' type, size or nature.

The document takes a multiple agency as well as a citizen-centric viewpoint. It provides guidance on: — smart city ecosystem privacy protection; — how standards can be used at a global level and at an organizational level for the benefit of citizens; and — processes for smart city ecosystem privacy protection. This document is applicable to all types and sizes of organizations, including public and private companies, government entities, and not-for-profit organizations that provide services in smart city environments.

This document provides an overview of cybersecurity. This document: — describes cybersecurity and relevant concepts, including how it is related to and different from information security; — establishes the context of cybersecurity; — does not cover all terms and definitions applicable to cybersecurity; and — does not limit other standards in defining new cybersecurity-related terms for use. This document is applicable to all types and sizes of organization (e.g. commercial enterprises, government agencies, not-for-profit organizations).

This document provides guidance on concepts, objectives and processes for the governance of information security, by which organizations can evaluate, direct, monitor and communicate the information security-related processes within the organization. The intended audience for this document is: — governing body and top management; — those who are responsible for evaluating, directing and monitoring an information security management system (ISMS) based on ISO/IEC 27001; — those responsible for information security management that takes place outside the scope of an ISMS based on ISO/IEC 27001, but within the scope of governance. This document is applicable to all types and sizes of organizations. All references to an ISMS in this document apply to an ISMS based on ISO/IEC 27001. This document focuses on the three types of ISMS organizations given in Annex B. However, this document can also be used by other types of organizations.

This document specifies the security requirements for physically unclonable functions (PUFs). Specified security requirements concern the output properties, tamper-resistance and unclonability of a single and a batch of PUFs. Since it depends on the application which security requirements a PUF needs to meet, this documents also describes the typical use cases of a PUF. Amongst PUF use cases, random number generation is out of scope in this document.

This document specifies methods for generating and testing prime numbers as required in cryptographic protocols and algorithms. Firstly, this document specifies methods for testing whether a given number is prime. The testing methods included in this document are divided into two groups: — probabilistic primality tests, which have a small error probability. All probabilistic tests described here can declare a composite to be a prime; — deterministic methods, which are guaranteed to give the right verdict. These methods use so-called primality certificates. Secondly, this document specifies methods to generate prime numbers. Again, both probabilistic and deterministic methods are presented. NOTE It is possible that readers with a background in algorithm theory have already had previous encounters with probabilistic and deterministic algorithms. The deterministic methods in this document internally still make use of random bits (to be generated via methods described in ISO/IEC 18031), and "deterministic" only refers to the fact that the output is correct with probability one. Annex A provides error probabilities that are utilized by the Miller-Rabin primality test. Annex B describes variants of the methods for generating primes so that particular cryptographic requirements can be met. Annex C defines primitives utilized by the prime generation and verification methods.

This document specifies five methods for authenticated encryption, i.e. defined ways of processing a data string with the following security objectives: — data confidentiality, i.e. protection against unauthorized disclosure of data; — data integrity, i.e. protection that enables the recipient of data to verify that it has not been modified; — data origin authentication, i.e. protection that enables the recipient of data to verify the identity of the data originator. All five methods specified in this document are based on a block cipher algorithm, and require the originator and the recipient of the protected data to share a secret key for this block cipher. Key management is outside the scope of this document. Key management techniques are defined in ISO/IEC 11770 (all parts). Four of the mechanisms in this document, namely mechanisms 3, 4, 5 (AAD variant only) and 6, allow data to be authenticated which is not encrypted. That is, these mechanisms allow a data string that is to be protected to be divided into two parts, D, the data string that is to be encrypted and integrity-protected, and A (the additional authenticated data) that is integrity-protected but not encrypted. In all cases, the string A can be empty. NOTE Examples of types of data that can need to be sent in unencrypted form, but whose integrity is to be protected, include addresses, port numbers, sequence numbers, protocol version numbers and other network protocol fields that indicate how the plaintext is to be handled, forwarded or processed.

This document specifies mechanisms to establish shared symmetric keys between groups of entities. It defines: — symmetric key-based key establishment mechanisms for multiple entities with a key distribution centre (KDC); and — symmetric key establishment mechanisms based on a general tree-based logical key structure with both individual rekeying and batch rekeying. It also defines key establishment mechanisms based on a key chain with group forward secrecy, group backward secrecy or both group forward and backward secrecy. This document also describes the required content of messages which carry keying material or are necessary to set up the conditions under which the keying material can be established. This document does not specify information that has no relation with key establishment mechanisms, nor does it specify other messages such as error messages. The explicit format of messages is not within the scope of this document. This document does not specify the means to be used to establish the initial secret keys required to be shared between each entity and the KDC, nor key lifecycle management. This document also does not explicitly address the issue of interdomain key management.

For security evaluation of biometric verification systems and biometric identification systems, this document is dedicated to the security evaluation of biometric recognition performance applying the ISO/IEC 15408 series. It provides requirements and recommendations to the developer and the evaluator for the supplementary activities on biometric recognition performance specified in ISO/IEC 19989-1. The evaluation of presentation attack detection techniques is out of the scope of this document except for presentation from impostor attempts under the policy of the intended use following the TOE guidance documentation.

For security evaluation of biometric recognition performance and presentation attack detection for biometric verification systems and biometric identification systemsthis document specifies: — extended security functional components to SFR Classes in ISO/IEC 15408-2; — supplementary activities to methodology specified in ISO/IEC 18045 for SAR Classes of ISO/IEC 15408-3. This document introduces the general framework for the security evaluation of biometric systems, including extended security functional components, and supplementary activities to methodology, which is additional evaluation activities and guidance/recommendations for an evaluator to handle those activities. The supplementary evaluation activities are developed in this document while the detailed recommendations are developed in ISO/IEC 19989-2 (for biometric recognition aspects) and in ISO/IEC 19989-3 (for presentation attack detection aspects). This document is applicable only to TOEs for single biometric characteristic type. However, the selection of a characteristic from multiple characteristics in SFRs is allowed.

This document specifies the security and privacy aspects applicable to the big data reference architecture (BDRA) including the big data roles, activities and functional components and also provides guidance on security and privacy operations for big data.

For security evaluation of biometric verification systems and biometric identification systems, this document is dedicated to security evaluation of presentation attack detection applying the ISO/IEC 15408 series. It provides recommendations and requirements to the developer and the evaluator for the supplementary activities on presentation attack detection specified in ISO/IEC 19989-1. This document is applicable only to TOEs for single biometric characteristic type but for the selection of a characteristic from multiple characteristics.

This document gives guidelines for information security incident response in ICT security operations. This document does this by firstly covering the operational aspects in ICT security operations from a people, processes and technology perspective. It then further focuses on information security incident response in ICT security operations including information security incident detection, reporting, triage, analysis, response, containment, eradication, recovery and conclusion. This document is not concerned with non-ICT incident response operations such as loss of paper-based documents. This document is based on the "Detection and reporting" phase, the "Assessment and decision" phase and the "Responses" phase of the "Information security incident management phases" model presented in ISO/IEC 27035‑1:2016. The principles given in this document are generic and intended to be applicable to all organizations, regardless of type, size or nature. Organizations can adjust the provisions given in this document according to their type, size and nature of business in relation to the information security risk situation. This document is also applicable to external organizations providing information security incident management services.

This document specifies mechanisms for the provision of specific, communication-related, non‑repudiation services using asymmetric cryptographic techniques.

This document serves as a general model for subsequent parts specifying non-repudiation mechanisms using cryptographic techniques. The ISO/IEC 13888 series provides non-repudiation mechanisms for the following phases of non-repudiation: — evidence generation; — evidence transfer, storage and retrieval; and — evidence verification. Dispute arbitration is outside the scope of the ISO/IEC 13888 series.

This document specifies controls which shape the content and the structure of online privacy notices as well as the process of asking for consent to collect and process personally identifiable information (PII) from PII principals. This document is applicable in any online context where a PII controller or any other entity processing PII informs PII principals of processing.

This document specifies the requirements for creating sector-specific standards that extend ISO/IEC 27001, and complement or amend ISO/IEC 27002 to support a specific sector (domain, application area or market). This document explains how to: — include requirements in addition to those in ISO/IEC 27001, — refine or interpret any of the ISO/IEC 27001 requirements, — include controls in addition to those of ISO/IEC 27001:2013, Annex A and ISO/IEC 27002, — modify any of the controls of ISO/IEC 27001:2013, Annex A and ISO/IEC 27002, — add guidance to or modify the guidance of ISO/IEC 27002. This document specifies that additional or refined requirements do not invalidate the requirements in ISO/IEC 27001. This document is applicable to those involved in producing sector-specific standards.

This document specifies the test calibration methods and apparatus used when calibrating test tools for cryptographic modules under ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 24759 against the test metrics defined in ISO/IEC 17825 for mitigation of non-invasive attack classes.